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Abstract
The problem of coordination failure, particularly in `team production'
situations, is central to a large numberof mircroeconomicas well as macroe-
conomic models. As this type of inefcient coordination poses a severe eco-
nomic problem, there is a need for institutions that foster efcient coordina-
tion of individual economic plans. In this paper, we introduce such a rather
classical economic institution: competition. In a series of laboratory exper-
iments, we reveal that the true reason for coordination failure is strategic
uncertainty, which can be reduced almost completely by introducing a ap-
propriately designed mechanism of (intergroup) competition.
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11 Introduction
The problem of coordination among economic agents is central to a large number
of macroeconomic as well as microeconomic situations. Coordination failure1 in
economics is stripped down to its very core in order statistic games. In this type
of games, coordination failure is particularly compelling for two reasons. First,
there is a multiplicity of equilibria in which stable coordination of individual plans
in action proles that are not Pareto efcient is very well possible. Second, apart
from the Pareto efcient equilibrium, there exists at least one other equilibrium,
which is attractive for risk averse individuals, i.e. a risk dominant equilibrium, an
equilibrium in (Maximin) security strategies, or an equilibrium with maximum
stochastic potential. Order statistic games as mentioned above reect the tension
between Pareto efciency and risk dominance central to important work by, for ex-
ample, Straub (1995), Kandori et al. (1993), Foster and Young (1990), and Young
(1993).
The same type of models is an essential building block of Post Walrasian Macroe-
conomics.2 In this branch of literature, some authors argue that coordination prob-
lems in certain economic environments are due to strategic complementarities. The
existence of strategic complementarities, then, can be seen as one of the main rea-
sons for the `macroeconomic problem' of actual output being lower than potential
aggregate output (Cooper and John, 1988; Cooper, 1999). Phenomena like invol-
untary unemployment are consequences of this. An important workhorse of this
school of thought, on the the anecdotal as well as on the analytical level, is the
`team production' model (see, for example, Cooper and John 1988; Bryant 1996).
A group of several workers is engaged in producing a good by means of a Leontief
technology. The output level is essentially determined by the worker exerting the
lowest effort inthe group. Alleffort exceeding the group minimum effort iswasted.
All the team members get wages positively correlated to the output level. As work-
ing effort causes disutility, team members exerting at exactly the minimum effort
level are best of. This model, which can be interpreted as aform ofan order statistic
game, was introduced in general terms by Bryant (1983) and extensively analyzed
in a more specic version in two seminal papers by Van Huyck et al. (1987, 1990).
The latter show that coordination in basic experimental settings does not lead to
the Pareto efcient equilibrium, but rather towards the equilibrium which is worst
from the point of view of social welfare. Obviously, as there is no (Walrasian
or other) `natural force' driving behavior to efciency, there is a need for mecha-
nisms leading individual behavior in this desired direction. Quoting Bryant (1996,
p. 159),
Coordination matters, and the institutions that provide coordination
1Coordination failure does not mean a situation where people do not coordinate, but rather a
situation of coordination in the `wrong' equilibrium.
2On PostWalrasian Macroeconomics in general, see Bowles and Gintis (1993) along with the
comments on this paper by Williamson (1993) and Stiglitz (1993).
2become a central element in the analysis of the economy.
The set of coordination devices (or `institutions') proposed throughout the litera-
ture and put to the experimental test includes a number of different approaches.
One of the earliest pieces of work aims at the reduction of the number of group
members (Van Huyck et al., 2001). Other ideas subsume ways of charging an en-
trance fee for the right to participate in the game: Cachon and Camerer (1996)
directly charge a fee, Van Huyck et al. (1993) stage an auction for the right to par-
ticipate, and Cooper et al. (1992, 1994) extend the coordination game unsing an
outside option such that the choice of the inside option, i.e. the play of the co-
ordination game itself, induces opportunity costs to the respective player. Other
alternative institutions involve the introduction of costly and costless communica-
tion between participants before and during the game (Blume and Ortmann, 2000;
Cooper et al., 1992, 1994), or a dramatic increase in the number of playing periods
(Berninghaus and Erhart, 1998).
While in line with this strand of literature, this paper argues in favor of another
coordination device. The story we are about to tell is a mere extension of the team
production story. If there is more than just one team producing the same good,
competition between these teams will solve the problem of coordination failure.
For this to take place, it does not matter, whether the teams compete within a
rm or whether teams essentially are rms. In the rst case, competition can be
used as an intrarm incentive scheme (see Nalbantian and Schotter 1997). In the
latter case, competition will arise quite naturally by the workings of the market.
In this paper, we show that intergroup competition eliminates inefciency almost
completely and drives workers' efforts very close to the Paretoefcient level. Thus,
if asking for a coordination device, the answer seems to be right before our very
eyes: competition.
This paper is based on the following general idea. Coordination failure is a symp-
tom of a problem rather than the problem itself. There must be a reason why people
do not choose the Pareto efcient action but some other action. Consequently, in
order to eliminate coordination failure, the rst step is to identify what causes this
problem. Thus, the rst question faced within this paper is, what drives coordi-
nation towards inefcient equilibria? There are at least two groups of different
possible causes of coordination failure. The rst is the group of individual be-
havioral reasons: spiteful behavior and competitive motives. The second group
includes strategic uncertainty.
Thus, the rst part of our work aims to point out that it is strategic uncertainty
rather than individual behavioral forces that causes the problem of coordination
failure.
After the main reason for coordination failure is uncovered, the second part of
this paper will be dedicated to the task of nding a coordination device, i.e. a
means of reducing strategic uncertainty. In fact, we do not actually `develop' but
rather just `apply' a concept, which  although stemming from the very heart of
economics has not been proposed as acoordination device inthis context before:
3competition. This concept is put to the experimental test and shown to improve the
efciency of coordination remarkably.
2 Experimental SetUp
The Basics
Our analysis is based on the game by Van Huyck et al. (1990), which is a minimum
effort coordination game. In this game, players are members of a group. The key
determinants of each player's payoff are that player's own choice of action and
the minimum choice of any of the group members, including the player himself.
Among other things, this game has often been interpreted as modeling the team
production problem. The effort level of each of the team members is essential and
a perfect complement to the effort of the others. (In fact, this setup constitutes a
situation of strategic complementarities.) Thus, the minimum effort level in a team
is the key determinant of the team's output. A fraction of the output minus the
individual's effort cost gives this individual's payoff (utility). The formalization of
this concept used for the purpose of this paper is given by the equation










gives the group minimum ef-
fort level, ei is individual i's effort level (:1ei give the effort costs), and a gives a
at payoff independent of efforts. (Although, in this paper, we use the metaphor
of team production in order to explain the setup of the experiments, our experi-
ments themselves were neutrally framed, i.e. presented to the participants without
reference to team production.)
Following Van Huyck et al. (1990), we reduced our participants' action spaces to a
discrete set of seven effort levels, labeled from `1' to `7'. Using these in the payoff
generating equation (1), we created two different payoff tables (for different values
of a) for use in different treatments. The respective payoff tables are given in Tab. 1
(for a = 1:3) and Tab. 2 (for a = :5). The normal form game represented by each
of these two tables has seven symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria, which are
the seven uniform action proles. While the equilibria are Paretoranked, two of
these proles are particularly remarkable. The uniform prole with every player
using the effort level of `7' is the Pareto efcient one. The prole with every player
playing aneffort level of`1'istheworst oneinterms ofwelfare but atthe sametime
it is the most secure, i.e. it consists of security actions in the sense of a maximin
strategy. This, in a way, carries over the idea of a risk dominant equilibrium to
games of the given type, i.e. games with more than two actions per player and
more than two players.3
3A second reason that this equilibrium resembles the idea of a risk dominant equilibrium is that
it has the highest stochastic potential and can been shown to be the global attractor to evolutionary
dynamics (Crawford, 1991; Goeree and Holt, 1998; Riechmann, 2002).
4Each of our experiments4 involved a group of seven players who did not encounter
each other before, during, or after theexperiment andstayed perfectly anonymous.5
Each player had the same set of actions, `1' to `7', available. Payoffs to the players
were given in Euro according to Tab. 1 or Tab. 2, depending on the treatment. Note
that the payoffs only differ with respect to parameter a, the at payoff independent
of the particular strategy choice.6
smallest choice within group
`group minimum'
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 2.00 1.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80
individual 6  1.90 1.70 1.50 1.30 1.10 0.90
choice 5   1.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00
4    1.70 1.50 1.30 1.10
3     1.60 1.40 1.20
2      1.50 1.30
1       1.40
Table 1: Payoff Table for the Baseline and Communication Treatments and for the Winner
Groups in the Competition Treatments
smallest choice within group
`group minimum'
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00
individual 6  1.10 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.10
choice 5   1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20
4    0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30
3     0.80 0.60 0.40
2      0.70 0.50
1       0.60
Table 2: Payoff Table for the Loser Groups in the Competition Treatments
In every treatment, participants started by playing three rounds of the game against
the computer in order to make sure they understood the game and the handling
of the computer program. They were informed of the fact that they were playing
against a computer and, consequently, could not learn anything about the behavior
of the other members of their group in these rounds. After these training rounds,
4The experiments were programmed and conducted withthe software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
5This is not true for the communication treatment (see below).
6Choosing tables that differ only with respect to the at parameter a means that we can rule
out different potentials of the equilibria being the reason for different behavior of our participants
(Goeree and Holt, 1998).
5participants played ten rounds of the game against the six other members of their
group. After each round, every participant was provided with direct feedback about
the minimum effort level in his group and his payoff in the period. Participants ini-
tially knew that they would be playing for 10 rounds. The nal payoff a participant
received consisted of the sum of his payoffs from all 10 rounds. We paid no show
up fee.
Treatments
We played four different treatments: the `baseline' treatment, the `communication'
treatment, and two different `competition' treatments, later called `Comp1' and
`Comp2'. We had six groups of seven participants play the baseline treatment
and six groups of seven participants play the communication treatment. In the
competition treatments, two different groups played `against' each other in each
experiment. Consequently, we had 12 groups of seven participants play each of the
two competition treatments.
In the baseline treatment, apart from the group size, we conducted exactly the same
experiments as Van Huyck et al. (1987, 1990). In particular, group members were
mutually anonymous, there was no communication among group members, and
there was no device to foster coordination towards efciency. The communica-
tion treatment is identical to the baseline treatment except for one key difference:
whereas participants in the baseline setup were perfectly foreign to each other and
were not allowed to communicate, we introduced the possibility of explicit and ex-
tensive communication to this treatment. After the usual two rounds of play against
the computer, all members were physically brought together and given a chance to
communicate and explicitly make plans on how to behave in the next ten rounds of
the game. Our goal in doing this was to provide every possible means of reducing
strategic uncertainty.
The competition treatments are the core elements of this piece of work. In every
experiment within these treatments, we had two groups of seven members play at
the same time. In each round, after participants made their choices, we determined
which group had the higher minimum choice (the higher `group minimum'). We
labeled this group the winner group and paid the members of this group according
to Tab. 1, which is based on a higher at payoff, i.e. it delivers a higher payoff to
every action prole than Tab. 2. The members of the loser group, i.e. the one with
the smaller group minimum, werepayed according toTab. 2. Inthe case ofatie, i.e.
both groups having the same minimum choice, we paid both groups according to
the table for the winner group, i.e. Tab. 1. The two competition treatments, Comp1
and Comp2differ only withrespect tothe information given totheparticipants after
each round of play. In the Comp1 treatment (which is a lowinformation treatment),
along with their personal payoffs and the minimum effort in their group, members
of each group were told whether their group was the winner or the loser group. In
the Comp2 treatment, we added only one more piece of information: in addition to
all the information given to the participants in the Comp1 treatment, participants
6were also informed about the specic value of the minimum choice in the other
group.
3 Experimental Evidence
Before going into the details of experimental results, it will prove helpful to clarify
a few technical terms. Coordination of individuals' plans can be complete or in-
complete, and efcient or inefcient. Coordination is complete if all players of the
game choose the same action, i.e. if a Nash equilibrium is played. Coordination is
efcient if it is complete and if the equilibrium reached is the Pareto efcient one,
i.e. with all players choosing effort level `7'. Coordination failure is a situation
of complete but inefcient coordination, whereas discoordination is a situation of
incomplete coordination, i.e. not an equilibrium prole at all.
The Benchmark Case
The benchmark case for all of our further experiments is the `baseline' treatment.
In the baseline treatment, participants behaved similarly to the participants of the
original experiments by Van Huyck et al. (1990). Over time, the minimum choices
within the groups tended to drop to the effort level of `1'. The equilibrium of
a common play of `1' seems to be the dominant attractor in this treatment (see
Figures 1(a) and 1(b)). The fact that convergence to this equilibrium is slower than
in the experiements by Van Huyck et al. can be ascribed to the fact that our groups,
with a size of seven, are much smaller than those in the original experiments by
Van Huyck et al., who used group sizes of 14 to 16. (See Van Huyck et al., 2001,
on the effect of the group size on the direction and speed of convergence.)
The Causes of Coordination Failure
The rst step of our analysis consists of exploring if coordination failure (i.e. com-
plete but inefcient coordination) is indeed caused by strategic uncertainty. Al-
though even Van Huyck et al. (1990, p. 247) claim that `coordination failure results
from strategic uncertainty', they do not put this claim to the experimental test. In-
deed, on a closer inspection, the reasons for coordination failure are not as clear as
they might seem. Apart from strategic uncertainty, there is at least one more group
of possible causes of complete but inefcient coordination: modes of behavior due
to spiteful or competitive motives.
Spiteful behavior or competitive motives make an individual want to perform better
than the other members of his group. The aim of a spiteful or competitive player
is the maximization of his relative payoff, i.e. the difference between his (absolute)
payoff and the (absolute) payoff of the others. This type of behavior will lead an
individual to choose the lowest possible effort level, i.e. the effort level of `1'.7
7For details on spiteful behavior in games, see Riechmann (2002).
7Strategic uncertainty, on the other hand, simply means that a player is not sure
what the other group members will do. If the player is sufciently risk averse, he
might choose not to play `7', but the `safest' action instead, which is the effort level
of `1'. Thus, in order to distinguish between the effects of competitive behavior, on
the one hand, and the effects of strategic uncertainty, on the other, we designed the
communication treatment. By giving the participants the chance to communicate,
we tried to reduce the degree of strategic uncertainty as much as possible. Note
that, while we nearly eliminate strategic uncertainty, individual behavioral motives
remain untouched. Thus, an experimental result of coordination to the effort level
of `1' should lead to the idea that coordination failure is caused by competitive
motives, while a result of efcient coordination is induced by the elimination of
strategic uncertainty. Put briey: efcient coordination in this treatment should
be interpreted as strong evidence that strategic uncertainty is the key reason for
coordination failure.
In all but the nal round of each of the experiments using the communication treat-
ment, every participant chose an effort level of `7'. The only exception to this is
one player in the last period of one experiment choosing `1'.8 This result is ex-
tremely different from both the result of the baseline treatment and the result to be
expected in the case of spiteful or competitive motives. Experimental results are
displayed in Fig. 1(a) for the group mean effort level as well as in Fig. 1(b) for the
group minimum effort level. (A summary of all experimental results is given in the
appendix.) The differences between play in the baseline treatment and play in the
communication treatment are highly signicant for every piece of data. In contrast
to the baseline treatment, in the communication treatment, i.e. in the absence of
strategic uncertainty, coordination towards the Pareto efcient equilibrium seems
to be an extremely easy task. This, of course, suggests very strongly that strategic
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(b) Group Minimum Effort
Figure 1: Communication vs. Baseline
8This clearly suggests an effect of participants knowing the time horizon of the game.
8Competition and Partial Coordination
Basic Competition
From the baseline and communication experiments, it becomes obvious that strate-
gic uncertainty is the major reason for coordination failure. Consequently, we de-
velop our core mechanism to reduce strategic uncertainty: group competition.
The basic idea behind this concept is the following. Obviously, the prospect of
attaining maximum payoff in the case of common choice of the Pareto efcient
action (i.e. `7') is not sufcient to reassure players that every other member of
their group will also choose this action. Common knowledge of Pareto efciency
is not enough to sufciently reduce strategic uncertainty.9 Consequently, an ef-
fective coordination device must provide players with a second reason to believe
that all others will take the efcient action, too. This second reason is provided by
the mechanism of group competition. In addition to aiming to maximize payoff,
players will want to belong to the winner group. (Which, in turn, increases pay-
offs even more.) The major point of reasoning here is the fact that by using the
instrument of competition between groups, we provide a second reason to believe
in other group members' rationality rather than just enhancing the rst reason, i.e.
pure payoff maximization.10
The results of our experiments show that the instrument of competition does indeed
work as a coordination device. Figure 2, for (mean) group minimum effort levels,
and Figure 3, for mean effort, display our results. Statistical analysis shows that
average performance of all groups involved in the Comp1 treatment (in the gure
labeled as Comp. 1 General) as well as performance of winner groups is signi-
cantly better than performance of the baseliners. Moreover, there is no signicant
difference between baseline performance and performance of loser groups, sug-
gesting that even the losers in a situation of competition do not perform worse than
players in the baseline situation.
The impression from Fig. 3 is supported by results from regressions (Tab. 3). De-
pending on the number of the round alone, a regression (model 1) shows that in the
core rounds of the experiments, i.e. rounds 3 to 9, the baseline setting generates a
signicant decline in effort over time (i.e. a coefcient for `Round' of -.306), while
in the Comp1 treatment this decline is much smaller (-.306 + .204 = -.102).
Further regression analysis helps to explore the causes of different behavior be-
tween the baseline and the Comp1 treatments. The regression in model 2 (Tab. 3)
9See Cooper (1994), who states that in games of the given type, the Pareto dominant equilibrium
does not provide a `natural focal point'.
10In order to make sure that there is no stakeeffect in our experiments, we conducted another six
experiments as a second baseline treatment, using the same rules as in the baseline case, but paying
the participants according to Tab. 2 (lower payoffs). In fact, we found no qualitative differences
between the results of this and the Baseline treatment, which supports our idea that winnergroups
in competition treatments do not perform better, just because their payoffs are taken from a `higher'
payoff table. As we found no qualitative differences, we see no need for further analysis of this
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Figure 3: Mean Effort Levels Comp1 vs. Baseline
10dep. var: Effort models

























adjusted R2 0.141 0.671
standard errors in brackets;
signicant at ???= 1%, ??= 5%, ?= 10%
Basic results for baseline treatment,
DC1: dummy indicating additional effects of Comp1
Table 3: Regressions: Effort Level in Core Rounds, Baseline vs. Comp1
11shows that in both treatments, effort levels are positively autocorrelated. The effort
levels of the previous round, Effort(t), and the round before the previous round,
Effort(t-1), have a signicantly positive inuence on present effort. The treatments
do not signicantly differ with respect to autocorrelation of effort.
A signicant inuence on baseliners' behavior is the group minimum effort in
roundst 2, GrMin(t-2). Thefact that the group minimum int 1, GrMin(t-1), has
no signicant inuence indicates some level of inertia in baseliners' behavior. Par-
ticipants in the Comp1 treatment, in contrast, condition the behavior on the group
minimum in t 1, whereas the total inuence of the minimum in t 2 is weak and
slightly negative. We interpret this negative inuence as a kind of correction of the
reaction to the minimum in t 1.
Thus, themaindifference between baseliners andComp1participants, whichmakes
the participants in Comp1 much more successful than baseliners, is the ability of
Comp1 participants to react to the group minimum effort much more quickly than
baseliners apparently do.
Completeness of Coordination
Our results would look even more positive if the loser groups, too, performed better
than the baseliners. Thus, the next question to be answered is that of why losers
do not perform better than they do. In order to answer this question, it helps to
introduce the notion of `wasted effort'.
An individual i's wasted effort, ew




Thus, wasted effort is a measure of effort wasted relative to the group. We measure
mean effort exceeding the group minimum effort.11










Mean wasted effort in a group is a measure of the degree of coordination in any
of the equilibria in this group, i.e. a measure of completeness of coordination. The
lower the group mean wasted effort, the higher the degree of coordination. If group
mean wasted effort equals zero, coordination is complete (no deviations) but not
necessarily efcient (i.e. on the `7').12
Fig. 4 shows mean wasted effort in the baseline treatment and for winners and
losers in the Comp1 treatment. The degree of coordination of the winners is very
11We do not measure the group mean distance to the effort level of `7', which is a more global
measure of `welfare'.
12Note thatmean wasted effort, though measuring wasted effort relativetothe group, stillmeasures
wasted effort in absolute terms, i.e. neglects the fact that groups with a low group minimum effort
level have a much greater potential for wasting effort than groups with a higher minimum effort level.




























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 4: Mean Wasted Effort Competition vs. Baseline
high from the beginning on and becomes even higher. Baseliners seem to learn to
coordinate in some equilibrium over time (ignoring the last period). The interesting
observation, though, concerns the losers: losers waste considerable effort in more
or less every round of the experiment. There is no clear tendency in loser groups
to coordinate over time. Thus, our results show that `losers' perform so badly not
because they coordinate to an inefcient equilibrium but because they do not coor-
dinate at all. The losers' problem is not coordination failure but discoordination.
Thus, competition in the form we designed in our Comp1 treatment can be seen
as a partial coordination device. It fosters efcient coordination of the winners but
leaves the losers in a state of discoordination.
Competition as a Coordination Device
The remedy to the problem of loser groups not coordinating lies in the design
of the Comp2 treatments. Here, we provide one extra piece of information to
the members of both competing groups: the minimum effort level played by their
respective opponent group in the preceding period. It turns out that this form of
competition is a highly efcient but fragile means of fostering coordination.
The Fragility of Competition
As will be shown in greater detail below, competition in this form, i.e. in the form
of our Comp2 treatment, remarkably improves the performance of both loser and
winner groups. Still, competition in our experiments turned out to be a slightly
fragile process. Altogether, we observed two very different, `typical' proles of
a Comp2 experiment. The more frequent one (observed in four out of six experi-
ments of the Comp2treatment) typically looks like that displayed in Fig. 5: Both
groups start at somewhat low effort levels and drive each other upwards towards
efciency. We will label Comp2 experiments showing this pattern of behavior
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(b) Mean Effort
Figure 5: Typical Prole of a Comp2a Experiment
The less frequent prole shows the case of a breakdown of competition. An ex-
emplary prole is displayed in Fig. 6. We mark these experiments as Comp2b
experiments. Here, after an initial phase similar to the Comp2a experiments, in
one round, one member of one of the groups chooses an effort level of `1'. This ac-
tion of one single group member triggers a breakdown of the mechanism of mutual
competition.13 In the following rounds, members of the same group lower their
effort levels, too. Finally, after some time, the average of effort levels within the
group approaches `1'. Even the winner group suffered from this behavior in their
opponent group. Winner groups of the Comp2b experiments played less efciently
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(b) Mean Effort
Figure 6: Typical Prole of a Comp2b Experiment
Although generally inducing an effective reduction of strategic uncertainty, the
process of Comp2 competition is highly sensitive to even just one player playing
13We will not speculate on the reasons why people triggered the breakdown. Still, one illustrative
remark seems in order. In one experiment, after playing all ten rounds, one participant confessed to
not having understood the game completely and thus having `tried out what happens if I play this and
that'. We did not include the results of this experiment into the pool of data evaluated for this paper.
14`1'. Aslong as the process ofcompetition does not break down, players accumulate
trust in their group members' rational play. But this trust is very fragile. As soon
as one group member violates the others' beliefs in common rationality, it is never
restored again.
We did not observe any form of `intermediate behavior': Either there is a choice
of effort level `1' in a noninitial round of the experiment, triggering a breakdown
of the coordination process, or the process of mutual driving up to efciency is ob-
served. As these two patterns of behavior are very clearly distinct, we will analyze
Comp2a and Comp2b experiments separately, whenever appropriate, in the further
course of this paper.
The Degree of Coordination
One basic problem of the loser groups in the Comp1 experiments has been iden-
tied as participants' lacking ability to coordinate. Consequently, the rst step in
analyzing the Comp2 treatment is to ask whether the degree of coordination im-
proved for the loser groups in this treatment.
Fig. 7 shows a plot of the results concerning the degree of coordination, i.e. it
displays the values of group mean wasted effort of the loser groups.14 In fact, loser
groups in the Comp2bcases (i.e. cases of competition breaking down) coordinate
very badly most of the time after the breakdown of competition (which happened
in round 4 of both Comp2 cases we observed). Nevertheless, from that point in
time on, we observe a remarkable degree of adjustment dynamics. Moreover, as
long as competition does not break down (i.e. for the Comp2a cases), group mean
wasted effort even of the loser groups falls below the level of the Comp1 losers
(see Fig. 7.)15
Thus, there is strong evidence that indeed the extra information distinguishing the
Comp2 from the Comp1 treatment results in a better degree of coordination.
The Degree of Efciency
From the results shown so far, it is clear that under the regime of type Comp2
competition, participants manage to achieve a very high degree of coordination.
Consequently, the next question to be answered is how efcient is coordination?
Accordingly, we now turn from the question of coordination or discoordination
back to the question of coordination failure. As we have shown before, the winners
in the Comp1 treatment manage to achieve a rather high degree of efciency. The
14The degree of coordination in the winner groups is so high that an explicit plot of the results is
not necessary in this context. Nevertheless, all the data can be found in the appendix.
15The differences between wasted effort levels of the losers in Comp1 and Comp2a are signicant
at the 5% level for the last three rounds (t-test twotailed (!) pvalues of .003, .015, and .049
for rounds 8, 9, and 10, respectively). The fact that signicances are relatively weak can be partly
ascribed to the fact that, in the Comp2a, sessions in the later periods there were very few observations
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Figure 7: Mean Wasted Effort Comp. Losers and Baseline
problem so far is largely a problem of coordination failure in the loser groups
(which weshowed is basically a problem of discoordination). Figures 8 and 9 show
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Figure 8: Group Minimum Effort
For group minimum effort (Fig. 8) and, even more obviously, for group mean effort
(Fig. 9), twotypes of proles of play can beclearly distinguished. The gures show
two different `clusters' of lines. The rst cluster, showing an upward moving ten-
dency for group minimum and mean effort levels, consists of the winner groups of
the Comp1 treatment, the winner groups of the Comp2b cases, and the winner and,
most remarkably, the loser groups of the Comp2a cases. There are no signicant
differences in mean effort between the groups in the upper cluster from round one
on. The lower cluster consists of the baseline groups and the loser groups of the
Comp1 treatment. Again, the differences between these two groups are insigni-
cant from the rst period on. The differences between the clusters are signicant
from round three on.16 The loser groups of the Comp2b cases cannot be subsumed
in one of the clusters. Statistical evidence is similar, though a little less clear, for
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Figure 9: Group Mean Effort
group minimum effort. Here, the upper cluster consists of the same groups as for
mean effort, except for the Comp2b winners, who perform signicantly worse than
members of the upper cluster but signicantly better than the groups belonging to
the lower cluster, which consists of baseliners and Comp1 losers. Again, Comp2b
losers are signicantly worse than any other group. Theinterpretation of these nd-
ings is straightforward. Starting with the fact that losers in the Comp1 treatments
do not perform better than baseliners, we nd that the introduction of the Comp2
setting remarkably improves efciency, as all groups of the Comp2a cases achieve
signicantly better results than baseline groups. For both cases of behavior in the
Comp2 treatment, i.e. for competition working well and for competition breaking
down, winner groups perform much better than baseliners. Even more encourag-
ing is the second nding: if competition does not break down (Comp2a cases), the
loser groups perform as well as the respective winners. Statistical analysis shows
that there is no signicant difference in mean and group minimum effort choice
between the Comp2a winner and the Comp2a loser groups.
Summarizing, competition in the formofthe Comp2 setting turns out to beasimple
and, at the same time, perfectly performing coordination device, fostering efcient
coordination of both groups involved, winners and losers.
The Impact of Extra Information
It is obvious that the one piece of extra information that distinguishes the Comp1
from the Comp2 treatment has a remarkable effect on participants' behavior. Thus,
it is interesting to explore how this piece of extra information actually works on
people's way of acting. For this purpose, we conducted two regressions, the re-
sults of which can be found in Tab. 4. The rst regression compares the effect
of different pieces of information on the behavior of all participants in the win-
ner groups of the Comp1 and Comp2a treatments. The second regression is the
winners and baseliners in round three. The pvalues are based on pairwise comparisons using ttests
with a Holmcorrection due to the comparison of more than two samples. The results of all statistical
computation will be made available on our interne site.
17same, but restricted to the individuals who exerted the group minimum effort in the
previous respective round. These participants' behavior is particularly important
because, in the previous round, they determined the largest part of all the other
participants' payoff (and, as the rst of the regressions shows, the largest part of
all participants' current behavior). The dependent variable in the regressions is the
effort in the current round t, Effort, where rounds in focus range from t = 3
to t = 9, thus neglecting initialround and lastround effects. The regressions ex-
plore the effect of the round itself, Round, the effect of players' own behavior in
the two previous rounds, Effort(t-1) and Effort(t-2),of the group min-
imum in the two previous rounds, GrMin(t-1) and GrMin(t-2), and of the
other group's minimum effort level in the two previous rounds, OtherMin(t-1)
and OtherMin(t-2).17 The regressions are dummy regressions and DC2aW is a
dummy indicating the extra effects on the behavior of the winners of the Comp2a
cases. As the additional information given to the participants in the Comp2 treat-
ment, i.e. the information about the other group's minimum effort level in the past,
is given by the variables OtherMin(t-1) and OtherMin(t-2), we expect
these variables to have no or very little effect on the behavior of the Comp1 groups
but to have a large inuence on the behavior of the Comp2 groups.
In fact, this is what we nd in the data. The effect of the other group's minimum
effort in the previous round is insignicant for the Comp1 groups in the regression
for all players as well as in the regression for minimum players. The opponent
group's minimum effort two rounds earlier has a signicant inuence on all Comp1
players' effort level, but there is no such inuence on the most important player in
the group, i.e. the minimum player. This is different for the Comp2 groups. For all
players, but particularly for the minimum players, the opponent group's minimum
play in t  1 and in t  2 have a highly signicant inuence. The inuence of the
other group's minimum effort level in t  1 is positive, indicating an increase in
one group's effort as a reaction to a high opponent group's effort. The reaction on
the opponents' minimum in t  2 is negative, thus indicating a kind of correction
to the t  1 reaction.
Comparing the causes of behavior of the Comp1 and the Comp2a participants,
we might conclude that the focus of the participants shifts from their own group's
history of play to their opponent group's. In Comp1, participants base their cur-
rent behavior on their own group's minimum in t  1 and in t  2, where the rst
has a positive, and the second a negative, inuence on current effort. For mem-
bers of the Comp2a winner groups, these effects are much weaker. (The effect of
GrMin(t-1) is reduced to .246, the effect of GrMin(t-2) to -.094.) Instead,
there is a larger effect of the opponent group's minimum effort level, showing
the same directions as the effect of the own group's minimum effort on Comp1
participants: The inuence is positive for OtherMin(t-1) and negative for
17GrMin(t-1) does not occur in the regression for the group minimum players because, for this
group of players, this is the same as Effort(t-1), the effort level in this round, thus causing a
singularity in the regression matrix.



















DC2aW: Round -0.024 0.058?
(0.028) (0.033)
DC2aW: Effort(t-1) -0.07 -0.132
(0.077) (0.126)




DC2aW: GrMin(t-2) 0.353??? -0.109
(0.087054) (0.11615)
DC2aW: OtherMin(t-1) 0.169? 0.362???
(0.087) (0.123)
DC2aW: OtherMin(t-2) -0.251??? -0.483???
(0.075) (0.103)
adjusted R2 0.727 0.827
standard errors in brackets; signicant at ???= 1%, ??= 5%, ?= 10%
Dummy DC2aW: indicating additional effects for Comp2a Winners
Table 4: Regressions II: Comp1 Winners vs. Comp2a Winners
19OtherMin(t-2). Thus, one might conclude that Cooper (1994) is right in stat-
ing that history creates a focal point for people's behavior, but we can make this
statement even clearer. It is the history of one's own play that matters in `sim-
ple' (Comp1 type) competition, but if competition is to serve as a truly successful
coordination device, it is also the history of the opponent that matters.
4 Summary
Competition, if appropriately designed, is a remarkably successful coordination
device. Although the idea of competition as a coordination device goes back to
at least Adam Smith's invisible hand, it has not been analyzed in the context of
minimum effort coordination games before.
We show that the problem of coordination failure in minimum effort games (e.g. in
the famous `group production' case) can basically be attributed to the prevalence
of strategic uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty can be eliminated by using the in-
stitution of competition. In a setting of two `teams' competing against each other,
at least the winner team performs nearly Pareto efciently, while the losers greatly
suffer from discoordination. This further problem can be solved by adding a piece
of extra information to the process of competition. As soon as both teams learn
about the level of last period's minimum effort in their competing team, perfor-
mance of both teams is signicantly better than in the baseline setting (without
competition) and nearly efcient.
The only drawback to this result is the nding that the process of competition is
extremely sensitive to shocks, such as noncooperative behavior of group mem-
bers. Consequently, a question for further research is how to reduce this sensitivity
in order to make competition both a successful and robust coordination device.
20Appendix A: On Measures of Wasted Effort
The measure of wasted effort used in the main text,
ew
i = ei emin;
for the individual, and
ew = e emin;
gives wasted effort relative to the group but not relative to potential maximum
wasted effort in the group. The idea is as follows. A group with a minimum effort
of emin = 1 has a relatively large potential for wasting effort. The highest possible
ew
i is reached by an individual playing ei = 7: ew
i = 7 1 = 6. A group with a high
minimum effort level, on the other hand, has a relatively low potential maximum
wasted effort, ew
i =7 6=1 for ei =7. Consequently, in the experiments, it might
be the case that groups have a higher level of wasted effort, only because their
`potential' level of wasted effort is high.
A better measure of wasted effort, taking this problem into account, might be a
measure of wasted effort relative to maximum potential wasted effort:
wi =
ei emin
7 emin for emin 6= 7
gives individual i's wasted effort ei  emin relative to maximum potential effort in








This measure has a straightforward interpretation. If group mean relative wasted
effort is, say, :43, this means that this group wastes 45% of the effort it can waste
in the worst case. w lies between 0 and 1, actually giving a degree of wasted effort.
The disadvantage of this measure, though, is the fact that, in our model of discrete
effort levels, it is not `nely grained' enough to sufciently describe behavior: In
a group with a minimum effort level of `6', for example, the only possible positive
degree of relative wasted effort an individual can reach is 1 (i.e. 100 %). If the
individual chooses `7', nothing is wasted, if he chooses '6` (the only possible other
choice), wi equals 1. This measure is far too coarse to be of any sensible use for
our model. Consequently, we do not use it in the main text. The data generated by
this measure, however, are given in Appendix B.
Appendix B: Data
Tables 6 and 5 give the mean effort levels and the group minimum effort levels of
the different treatments. Tables 7 and 8 show data for wasted effort in absolute and
relative terms, respectively.
21round base1 comm comp1 comp2 comp2a comp2b
gen. win. los. gen. win. los. gen. win. los. gen. win. los.
1 3.00 7.00 3.42 4.00 2.60 3.67 5 2.33 3.75 5 2.5 3.5 5 2
2 2.83 7.00 3.25 4.67 1.83 4.17 4.71 3.4 4.38 4.8 3.67 3.75 4.5 3
3 2.67 7.00 3.58 5.17 2.00 4.83 5.57 3.8 5 5.6 4 4.5 5.5 3.5
4 2.50 7.00 3.67 5.33 2.00 4.58 5.33 2.33 5.38 5.43 5 3 5 1
5 2.50 7.00 3.75 5.00 2.00 4.67 5.63 2.75 5.5 5.83 4.5 3 5 1
6 2.33 7.00 3.92 5.67 2.17 4.75 5.67 2 5.63 5.86 4 3 5 1
7 2.17 7.00 3.83 5.29 1.80 4.83 5.67 2.33 5.88 6 5 2.75 4.5 1
8 2.17 7.00 3.83 5.83 1.83 5.17 6 3.5 6.25 6.33 6 3 5 1
9 2.17 7.00 3.67 5.83 1.50 5.25 6.11 2.67 6.38 6.43 6 3 5 1
10 1.00 6.83 3.67 5.83 2.50 5.17 6 2.67 6.38 6.43 6 2.75 4.5 1
Table 5: Mean Group Minimum Effort
round base1 comm comp1 comp2 comp2a comp2b
gen. win. los. gen. win. los. gen. win. los. gen. win. los.
1 6.12 7.00 5.76 6.08 5.31 6.05 6.31 5.79 6.13 6.29 5.96 5.89 6.36 5.43
2 5.36 7.00 5.57 6.05 5.10 5.88 6.31 5.29 5.98 6.34 5.38 5.68 6.21 5.14
3 4.55 7.00 5.37 6.21 4.52 6.06 6.37 5.63 6.2 6.4 5.86 5.79 6.29 5.29
4 3.86 7.00 5.18 6.14 4.21 6.20 6.40 5.62 6.45 6.43 6.57 5.71 6.29 5.14
5 3.71 7.00 4.99 5.61 4.11 6.12 6.46 5.43 6.43 6.52 6.14 5.5 6.29 4.71
6 3.57 7.00 4.86 6.05 3.67 5.95 6.40 4.62 6.46 6.55 5.86 4.93 5.86 4
7 3.24 7.00 4.89 5.82 3.60 5.92 6.32 4.71 6.52 6.53 6.43 4.71 5.57 3.86
8 2.74 7.00 4.83 6.17 3.50 5.73 6.34 4.50 6.59 6.55 6.71 4 5.71 2.29
9 2.60 7.00 4.68 6.19 3.17 5.81 6.44 3.90 6.64 6.61 6.86 4.14 5.86 2.43
10 2.64 6.86 4.57 6.14 3.00 5.68 6.40 3.52 6.64 6.61 6.86 3.75 5.64 1.86
Table 6: Mean Effort
round base1 comm comp1 comp2 comp2a comp2b
gen. win. los. gen. win. los. gen. win. los. gen. win. los.
1 3.12 0.00 2.35 2.08 2.71 2.38 1.31 3.45 2.38 1.29 3.46 2.39 1.36 3.43
2 2.52 0.00 2.32 1.38 3.26 1.71 1.59 1.89 1.61 1.54 1.71 1.93 1.71 2.14
3 1.88 0.00 1.79 1.05 2.52 1.23 0.80 1.83 1.2 0.8 1.86 1.29 0.79 1.79
4 1.36 0.00 1.51 0.81 2.21 1.62 1.06 3.29 1.07 1 1.57 2.71 1.29 4.14
5 1.21 0.00 1.24 0.61 2.11 1.45 0.84 2.68 0.93 0.69 1.64 2.5 1.29 3.71
6 1.24 0.00 0.94 0.38 1.50 1.20 0.73 2.62 0.84 0.69 1.86 1.93 0.86 3
7 1.07 0.00 1.06 0.53 1.80 1.08 0.65 2.38 0.64 0.53 1.43 1.96 1.07 2.86
8 0.57 0.00 1.00 0.33 1.67 0.56 0.34 1.00 0.34 0.21 0.71 1 0.71 1.29
9 0.43 0.00 1.01 0.36 1.67 0.56 0.33 1.24 0.27 0.18 0.86 1.14 0.86 1.43
10 1.64 0.86 0.90 0.31 1.50 0.51 0.40 0.86 0.27 0.18 0.86 1 1.14 0.86
Table 7: Mean Wasted Effort
22round base1 comm comp1 comp2 comp2a comp2b
gen. win. los. gen. win. los. gen. win. los. gen. win. los.
1 0.80 0.00 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.70 0.63 0.78 0.68 0.68 0.67
2 0.64 0.00 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.66 0.52 0.61 0.66 0.51 0.60 0.67 0.54
3 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.57 0.59 0.55 0.59 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.52
4 0.33 0.00 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.66 0.63 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.79 0.67 0.64 0.69
5 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.19 0.45 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.64 0.62
6 0.27 0.00 0.23 0.13 0.33 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.46 0.43 0.50
7 0.23 0.00 0.25 0.16 0.38 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.71 0.44 0.40 0.48
8 0.12 0.00 0.22 0.13 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.46 0.34 0.21 0.71 0.29 0.36 0.21
9 0.08 0.00 0.22 0.13 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.44 0.27 0.18 0.86 0.33 0.43 0.24
10 0.27 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.38 0.27 0.18 0.86 0.29 0.43 0.14
Table 8: Mean Relative Wasted Effort
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